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LIBERALISM AND PROPERTY IN COLOMBIA:  
PROPERTY AS A RIGHT AND PROPERTY 
AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION 
Daniel Bonilla*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Liberalism has determined the structure of the property law regime in 
Colombia.  A genealogical analysis of the legal forms of the recent past that 
define and regulate property provides evidence of three key periods in the 
creation and consolidation of the right to property in the country.  These 
three moments revolve around different forms of interpreting and balancing 
three fundamental values in the liberal canon:  autonomy, equality, and 
solidarity.  The first period, beginning in 1886 and ending in 1936, was 
marked by a classical liberal property system in which the Constitution and 
civil law formed ideologically coherent machinery that prioritized the 
principle of autonomy over the principles of equality and solidarity.  In this 
legal structure, the Civil Code defined property as a subjective and nearly 
absolute right.  This form of conceiving the right to property was strongly 
influenced by classical liberalism and the codifying movement that had as 
its paradigmatic product the Civil Code of Napoleon of 1804.1  The 
Colombian Civil Code of 1887 is a replica of the Chilean Civil Code 
drafted by Andrés Bello, which was strongly influenced by the Napoleonic 
Code.2  The Constitution of 1886 recognizes property as an acquired right 
and mandates that the state not violate this right.3
The second period, between 1936 and 1991, was structured as a mixed 
system that recognized the social function of property in the Constitution 
but that preserved an individualistic notion of property in the Civil Code.  
In this legal framework, there was tension between principles of autonomy 
  However, the 
Constitution also recognizes the right of the state to expropriate property for 
reasons of public use. 
 
*  Associate Professor and Co-director of the Public Interest Law Group, University of the 
Andes School of Law, Bogotá, Colombia.  He is currently the Leitner Center Distinguished 
Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School.  Unless indicated, translations from materials in 
Spanish are the author’s own. 
 1. M.C. Mirow, The Code Napoléon:  Buried but Ruling in Latin America, 33 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 179, 179 (2005). 
 2. M.C. Mirow, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America:  Andrés Bello’s Use of the 
Code Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 291 (2001).  The 
Chilean Civil Code was also strongly influenced by Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis and 
Alfonso X’s Seven Parts (Siete Partidas). Id. at 304, 309. 
 3. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 58 (W.M. Gibson trans., 
1948). 
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on the one hand, and solidarity and equality on the other.  Amending the 
Constitution of 1886, Legislative Act 1 of 1936 states that property is a 
social function and includes reasoning of social interest (in addition to 
public use) to justify the expropriation of property.4
Nevertheless, the tension between the principles of solidarity, autonomy, 
and equality that characterize this property system appears not only in the 
different concepts of property defended in the Constitution and civil law.  It 
is also made explicit in the constitutional reform itself.  Article 10 of 
Legislative Act 1 defines property as an individual right and as a social 
function.  Thus, the concepts of property as right and property as social 
function, which are contradictory, structure the constitutional reform of 
1936.  This inconsistency was also made explicit with the issuance of Law 
200 of 1936, the agrarian reform law,
  In contrast, the 
constitutional reform of 1936 preserved the classical liberal definition of 
property from the Civil Code.  Thus, although the Constitution defines 
property by means of the principle of solidarity, the Civil Code does so 
using the principle of autonomy. 
5 and the issuance of Law 9 of 1989, 
the law of urban reform.6  Both laws define property as a social function.  
These three norms are clearly based on León Duguit’s critiques to the 
classical liberal concept of property and his definition of property as a 
social function.7  However, Congress did not realize that the two concepts 
of property are incompatible, as noted by Duguit.  The case law of the 
Supreme Court does not resolve this tension either.  Rather, it maintains it.  
Although the Court defends and develops the constitutional clause that 
indicates that property is a social function, it also upholds the 
constitutionality of Article 669 of the Civil Code, which defines property 
from a classical liberal view.8
The inconsistency of the property system becomes more complex when 
examining the tensions that exist within the legal culture surrounding the 
concept of “Constitution.”  In one corner of the debate, a classical legal 
culture emerges that advocates for a radical separation between private and 
public law and a notion of the Constitution as a political program—not as 
the supreme norm of the legal system that can be immediately and directly 
applied.  This legal culture, inherited from the classical French liberalism 
that influenced the Regeneration,
 
9
 
 4. Legislative Act 1/36, agosto 5, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23263, art. 10. 
 considers statutes to be supreme in the 
legal order.  The Constitution can only be applied when the legislature 
 5. L. 200/36, diciembre 30, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23388. 
 6. L. 9/89, enero 11, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 38650. 
 7. Eliécer Batista Pereira & James Iván Coral Lucero, La función social de la 
propiedad:  la recepción de León Duguit en Colombia, 10 CRITERIO JURÍDICO, no. 1, 2010, at 
59 (Colom.). 
 8. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Plena agosto 11, 1988, 
M.P: Jairo Duque Pérez.  Cases decided by the Colombian Supreme Court since 1988 can be 
found at http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj/csjt.jsp. 
 9. The Regeneration (La Regeneración) was the political movement led by Miguel 
Antonio Caro and Rafael Nuñez that was responsible for the drafting and approval of the 
1886 Constitution. See infra notes 18–25 and accompanying text. 
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makes laws that specify its mandates.  In the other corner, there was the 
Marching Revolution (Revolución en Marcha), the government program 
advocated by liberal president Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934–38).10
The third and final property system, instituted in 1991 and still in effect 
today, is an ideologically consistent constitutional and legal framework 
committed to the idea that the right to property must be defined through the 
principles of solidarity and equality.  Consequently, in this third property 
system, the principle of autonomy is subordinated to the principles of 
solidarity and equality.  Nevertheless, the ideological coherence of this third 
property system is a result of the case law of the Constitutional Court.  The 
Constitution of 1991 preserved the contradictions that spanned the second 
property system of Colombia’s recent history.  Article 58 of the 
Constitution states that property is a social function, that the state should 
protect rights to justly acquired property, and that the state may expropriate 
property for reasons of public use and social interest.
  This 
program focused on transforming the Constitution as a spearhead of 
political and social change.  This movement has at its center the 
constitutional recognition of a strong interventionist state in Colombia.  
That transformation, however, was significantly affected by a legal culture 
that considered civil law the true law and the center of the legal system. 
11
Nevertheless, in ruling C-595 of 1999, the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional the sections of Article 669 of the Civil Code that violated 
the constitutional right of property as a social function.
  Hence, the new 
Constitution reproduces the contents of Legislative Act 1 of 1936 and 
therefore preserves in its text the contradiction between property as right 
and property as function.  Similarly, the Constitution of 1991 preserved 
Article 669 of the Civil Code and thus the contradiction between an 
individualistic concept of property and one grounded in solidarity. 
12  In this decision, 
the Court also resolved the contradiction in the text of Article 58 of the 
Constitution between property as right and property as function.13
Yet, the Constitution of 1991 not only reproduces the text of the 
constitutional reform of 1936, but goes much further in defending the 
principle of solidarity.  Article 58 of the Constitution states that property 
has an ecological function, that the state may expropriate property by 
administrative means (not merely judicial), and that the state has the duty to 
  The 
Court stated that property is an individual right that has internal and 
external limits.  The Court then defended and questioned Duguit, who was 
mentioned explicitly.  For the Court, the social function of property is not 
inconsistent with the concept of a subjective individual right.  The Court 
views property as a right-duty that imposes social obligations on the owner. 
 
 10. DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA:  A NATION IN SPITE OF 
ITSELF 185–92 (1993). 
 11. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58 (Anna I. Vellvé Torras & Jefri 
J. Ruchti trans., 1991). 
 12. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99.  Cases decided by the Colombian Constitutional Court 
can be found at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/. 
 13. Id. 
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protect associational and collective forms of property.  The Constitution 
also expressly establishes that Colombia is a “social State of law” and that 
the principle of solidarity is one of the pillars of the Colombian State.14  
The Constitution makes clear that the social function of property is not an 
isolated legal form but is part of the institutional and ideological structure 
designed by the National Constituent Assembly of 1990 (NCA).  The case 
law of the Constitutional Court confirms this interpretation.  In a long line 
of case law, the Court develops the clause of the social function of property 
and protects the power of the state to regulate and limit this right.15
The three property systems were not built in a vacuum.  They are a 
function of the political struggles since the nineteenth century, which 
sought to define the basic structure of the Colombian state.  First, the 
individualistic property system emerged from the liberal authoritarian state 
established with the Constitution of 1886.  The emergence of this legal 
framework was a direct consequence of the triumph of the political 
movement of the Regeneration led by Miguel Antonio Caro and Rafael 
Núñez.  As a key instrument of the Regeneration project, the Constitution 
of 1886 had three primary objectives.  First, the Constitution sought to 
strengthen the Colombian nation-state around a conservative ideology in the 
cultural field.
 
16  The Regeneration established the Catholic religion and the 
Spanish language as the axes of the Colombian nation.17  Second, the 
Constitution aimed to ensure the order and unity of the country that had 
been challenged by the wars between federalists and centralists that 
dominated the Colombian political landscape during the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  With this in mind, the Regeneration implemented a 
politically centralized but administratively decentralized state.18  Similarly, 
it established a strong presidential system that recognized but limited 
classic individual freedoms.19
 
 14. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 1 (Anna I. Vellvé Torras & Jefri J. 
Ruchti trans., 1991). 
  Third, the Constitution intended to 
strengthen the emerging market economy that existed in the country in the 
late nineteenth century.  The Regeneration sought to bring Colombia out of 
an incipient capitalist economy centered on the plantation and into a 
 15. The Constitutional Court has decided ten cases directly related to the social function 
of property. See infra note 124. 
 16. See, e.g., ANTONIO BARRETO ROZO, VENTURAS Y DESVENTURAS DE LA 
REGENERACIÓN:  APUNTES DE HISTORIA JURÍDICA SOBRE EL PROYECTO POLÍTICO DE 1886 Y SUS 
TRANSFORMACIONES Y RUPTURAS EN EL SIGLO XX (2011). 
 17. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) arts. 38, 53 (W.M. Gibson 
trans., 1948).  The 1886 Constitution does not explicitly protect Spanish.  However, Spanish 
played a fundamental role in the conservative thought of the Regeneration.  The defense of 
the “Spanish Soul,” to which Colombia was a part, was directly linked with the protection of 
Spanish.  For the role played by Spanish and the “Spanish Soul” in the Regeneration, see 
Rafael Rubiano Muñoz, Derecho y Política:  Miguel Antonio Caro y la regeneración en 
Colombia a finales del siglo XIX, 6 OPINIÓN JURÍDICA, no. 12, 2007, at 141. 
 18. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 1, tit. XVIII (W.M. 
Gibson trans., 1948). 
 19. Id. tit. III, art. 59. 
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capitalist system connected to the international markets.20  The classic 
liberal property system that was introduced with the Constitution of 1886 
and the Civil Code of 1887 played a fundamental role in this project.  On 
one hand, it expressed and promoted the economic program of the 
Regeneration, focusing on the protection of private property;21 on the other 
hand, it facilitated the transfer and flow of goods in the weak Colombian 
market economy.22
After the rise of the individualistic property system, the mixed system 
(property as social function and individualist property) was born with the 
constitutionalization of the liberal interventionist state that occurred with 
Legislative Act 1 of 1936 (which amended the Constitution of 1886).  This 
change in the legal framework governing property was a consequence of 
López Pumarejo’s rise to the presidency and therefore the consolidation of 
the Liberal Party in power.
 
23  López Pumarejo’s government program, the 
Revolución en Marcha, contained the foundation that allowed for the 
constitutional recognition of the interventionist state in Colombia24—a state 
committed to distributive justice and therefore having broad powers to 
regulate the economy.  It is not surprising, then, that property was redefined 
as a social function under this government.25  This reinterpretation of 
property would permit the state to attack one of the primary social and 
economic problems Colombia has historically faced:  the inequitable 
distribution of land.26  Consequently, it also negated one of the primary 
sources of conflict in the country.  Property as a social function permitted 
the expropriation of land that was not put into production by the owners; it 
would, on paper, be the foundation of the most ambitious agrarian reform in 
Colombian history.27
Third, the property system based on solidarity was consolidated and 
expanded with the issuance of the Constitution of 1991 and the definition of 
 
 
 20. MARCO PALACIOS & FRANK SAFFORD, COLOMBIA:  PAÍS FRAGMENTADO, SOCIEDAD 
DIVIDIDA:  SU HISTORIA 469–71 (2002). 
 21. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) arts. 31–32 (W.M. Gibson 
trans., 1948). 
 22. See id.  Articles 31 and 32 recognized the right to private property, the exceptional 
character of expropriation, and the obligation to compensate all expropriations. Id. Secure 
property rights are a precondition of any market economy. 
 23. Revolución en Marcha, a program of López Pumarejo’s government, consolidated 
what has been called the liberal hegemony in Colombia that began with the government of 
Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930–34).  Olaya Herrera’s government signified the ascent of the 
Liberal Party after the conservative Republic was initiated in 1886. See BUSHNELL, supra 
note 10, at 181–85. 
 24. See Legislative Act 1/36, agosto 5, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23263, art. 11. 
 25. See id. art. 10. 
 26. Sandra Botero, La reforma constitucional de 1936, el Estado y las políticas sociales 
en Colombia, 33 ANUARIO COLOMBIANO DE HISTORIA SOCIAL Y DE LA CULTURA 85, 92–97 
(2006), available at http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/src/inicio/ArtPdfRed.jsp?iCve=
127112581005. 
 27. See generally Catherine LeGrand, Los antecedentes agrarios de la violencia:  el 
conflicto social en la frontera colombiana, 1850–1936, in PASADO Y PRESENTE DE LA 
VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA 87 (Gonzalo Sánchez & Ricardo Peñaranda eds., 1986). 
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the Colombian state as a Social State of Law.28  This new property system 
was the result of broad political agreement reached in the NCA on the need 
to strengthen the constitutional foundations of the interventionist state in 
Colombia.  Consequently, property as social function became a cornerstone 
of the constitutional edifice.29  Again, this legal institution was presented as 
the instrument that would allow for attacking the unsolved problem of the 
inequitable distribution of land.  Property as a social function was therefore 
presented as a tool that would help address some of the problems of 
inequality and poverty central in the history of Colombia.  One cannot 
forget that the NCA was seen by broad sectors of Colombian society as a 
mechanism to rebuild the political community and to achieve peace and 
social justice in the country.30  These sectors were convinced that an 
inclusive and democratic constitutional process in which all Colombians 
were represented would permit the creation of a legitimate state with the 
tools necessary to tackle contemporary Colombia’s serious economic, 
political, and social problems.31
Nevertheless, the three periods that comprise the recent history of the 
right to property in Colombia are structured around a set of five conceptual 
oppositions:  individualism–solidarity; limited intervention–general 
intervention; private–public; Constitution as political program–Constitution 
as norm; and property as a right–property as social function.  These 
conceptual oppositions have defined the academic and political debate on 
property over the past 125 years in Colombia.  In this dualistic debate, each 
of the components of the conceptual oppositions has been intertwined with 
its ideological “peer” in order to shape two theoretical camps continually in 
conflict.  Thus, on one end, the classical liberal side is made up of the 
categories “individualism,” “limited intervention,” “private,” “Constitution 
as a political program,” and “ownership as a right”; on the other end, the 
liberal interventionist side is comprised of the categories of “solidarity,” 
“general intervention,” “public,” “Constitution as a norm,” and “property as 
social function.”  Thus, reconstructing the legal and political imagination on 
property in recent Colombian history has to evaluate how these conceptual 
oppositions interact, are interpreted, and accommodated. 
 
To develop these ideas, I divide this Article into three parts.  In the first 
Part, I reconstruct and examine the classical liberal system that constituted 
the first key period of the recent history of the right to property in Colombia 
(1886–1936).  The proclamation of the Constitution of 1886 is a milestone 
in the consolidation of the modern nation-state in Colombia.  The 
 
 28. María Mercedes Maldonado Copello, La propiedad en la constitución colombiana 
de 1991:  superando la tradición del codigo civil 8 (Nov. 2001), http://info.worldbank.org/
etools/docs/library/135756/M3-06-C-MariaMMaldonado-LA%20PROPIEDAD%20EN%20
LA%20CONSTITUCI%D3N%20COLOMBIANA-Bogota2001.pdf. 
 29. Aleksey Herrera Robles, Límites constitucionales y legales al derecho de dominio en 
Colombia:  análisis desde el derecho público, 20 REVISTA DE DERECHO, UNIVERSIDAD DEL 
NORTE 57 (2003). 
 30. Luis Alberto Restrepo, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente en Colombia:  ¿Concluirá 
por fin el Frente Nacional?, in 12 ANÁLISIS POLÍTICO 61–65 (1991). 
 31. Id. 
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Constitution of the Regeneration remained in effect until 1991, with several 
modifications.  In the second Part, I analyze the mixed system of property, 
classical liberal–liberal interventionist, which forms the second period in 
the recent history of the right to property in the country (1936–91).  In the 
third and final Part, I study the liberal interventionist property system 
consolidated with the Constitution of 1991 and still in effect today.  In each 
of these sections, I analyze the components of the conceptual oppositions 
that justify the three property systems.  I also examine the contents of these 
categories and how they intertwine to build the models that have served to 
define and regulate property in the country.  The Article thus does not aim 
to examine the effectiveness of the three property systems or their 
consequences.  Rather, it seeks to describe their components, to analyze the 
legal and political categories that justify them, and to demonstrate the ties 
with the political contexts in which they emerge and are consolidated. 
I.  THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL PROPERTY SYSTEM 
The first stage of the recent history of property in Colombia has the 
Constitution of 1886 and the Civil Code of 1887 as its two major legal 
components, and classical liberalism as its political justification.  During 
this period, both the Constitution and the law were committed to a system 
configured around the autonomy of the owner and in which the principle of 
equality was generally interpreted as the equality of all owners before the 
law.  Similarly, in this legal framework, solidarity was not a relevant value 
for interpreting the right to property.  Thus, this legal framework defines 
property as an individual and nearly absolute right.  Article 669 of the Civil 
Code affirms, “Ownership (also called property) is the real right to a 
corporeal thing, to enjoy and dispose of it arbitrarily, not being against the 
law or against the rights of others.”32
 Rights acquired by individuals and corporations under a proper title 
and according to the civil law shall not be disavowed or violated by laws 
subsequently enacted.  When in the application of a law enacted for the 
public welfare there should result a conflict between private rights and a 
recognized necessity for that law, private interests shall yield to public 
  Conversely, and consistent with the 
classical liberalism implicit in the Civil Code, the Constitution of 1886 
required the state to protect citizens’ right to property.  The Constitution 
recognized property as an acquired right and prohibited the law from 
ignoring or violating rights to properties that were justly obtained.  
However, the Constitution of 1886 also established the right of the state to 
expropriate property for reasons of public use that are defined by law, 
provided that the owner receives just compensation.  Article 31 of the 
Constitution of 1886 states: 
 
 32. CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code) art. 669.  The classical liberal property system is formed 
also by Articles 670 (ownership of intangible property) and 671 (intellectual property). Id. 
arts. 670, 671. 
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interests.  But for any expropriations which it may be necessary to make 
there shall be given full indemnity . . . .33
This property system reproduced the legal framework established in the 
French Civil Code of 1804.  The Colombian Civil Code is a replica of the 
Chilean Civil Code drafted by Andrés Bello, which was strongly influenced 
by the Napoleonic Code.
 
34  Article 544 of the Civil Code of Napoleon, 
known as the owners’ code, affirms, “Property is the right of enjoying and 
disposing of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used 
in a way prohibited by the laws or statutes. . . .  No one can be compelled to 
give up his property, except for the public good, and for a just and previous 
indemnity.”35  The only difference between the two property systems is that 
the Colombian one separates the components of the right to property that in 
the French code appear united.36  The Civil Code of 1887 defines the right 
to property and outlines its limits and the Constitution of 1886 declares the 
right of the state to expropriate goods for reasons of public use.  
Nevertheless, both documents are committed to a system of property that 
revolves around the autonomy and formal equality of owners.37
This system of property protects and controls the relationship between an 
autonomous, abstract, and isolated individual and an object.
 
38  In this 
regard, the owner has a high degree of autonomy over her own property.  
Owners have the power to make use of, gather the fruits of, and dispose of 
the material or immaterial reality they control in the way they deem 
appropriate.  In the Colombian Civil Code, this broad degree of discretion is 
marked by the adverb “arbitrarily,” which qualifies how the owner can 
make use of the object.39
 
 33. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 31 (W.M. Gibson trans., 
1948). 
  The only limits imposed are those of the rights of 
others and public use.  The rule is the state’s protection of the autonomy 
 34. DIEGO EDUARDO LÓPEZ MEDINA, EL DERECHO DE LOS JUECES:  OBLIGATORIEDAD DEL 
PRECEDENTE CONSTITUCIONAL, ANÁLISIS DE SENTENCIAS Y LÍNEAS JURISPRUDENCIALES Y 
TEORÍA DEL DERECHO JUDICIAL 8–9 (Editorial Legis, 8th prtg., Julio 2009). 
 35. CODE NAPOLEON arts. 544–545 (London, Thomas Davison, 1824) (Fr. 1804).  
Article 582 of the Chilean Civil Code states that “Ownership (also called property) is the real 
right to a corporeal thing, to enjoy and dispose of it arbitrarily, not being against the law or 
against the rights of others.” CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code) art. 582 (Chile). 
 36. A minor difference between the texts of the French Civil Code and Bello’s code is 
that in the latter the word “regulations” is replaced by the phrase “rights of others.”  This 
difference is not particularly relevant in that one of the liberal principles justifying the two 
codes is that the rights of third parties limit individual rights. 
 37. Moreover, both legal systems consider the right of property to be a natural right.  
Article 19 of the 1886 Political Constitution of Colombia states, “The authorities of the 
Republic are established in order to protect the lives, honor, and property of all persons 
residing in Colombia, and to assure the mutual observance of natural rights, and the 
prevention and punishment of crimes.” CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA 
(1886) art. 19 (W.M. Gibson trans., 1948).  Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen of 1789 states, “The purpose of all civil associations is the preservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, security, and 
resistance to oppression.” DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 2 
(Fr. 1789) (R. Helleu trans., 1918). 
 38. LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 111–51 (1987). 
 39. CÓDIGO CIVIL (Civil Code), art. 669. 
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that the owner has over her property.  The exception is its limitation.  The 
limits imposed on the right to property are therefore external.  The owner 
has no obligation in connection with the object.  She has no duty to relate to 
her property in a particular way.  Her only duty is to act in a way that does 
not violate the rights of third parties.  In the terms of the Colombian civil 
code, the owner cannot act “contrary to the law or the rights of others.”40
In this way, the subject of right to property in the Constitution of 1886 
and the Civil Code of 1887 is a person who has the ability to make 
decisions about the property she wants to acquire and how to use it.  These 
are not marginal decisions.  They are part of the process of choosing, 
modifying, and implementing a life plan.  Property plays a fundamental role 
in this process of the construction and reconstruction of the subject.
 
41  An 
individual’s property is both an expression and an instrument of their life 
plan.  Property involves a series of decisions about the things that the 
subject considers valuable and the role these things play in the realization of 
her moral commitments.  Consequently, property constructs and expresses 
individual identity.  In classical liberalism, the individual and her property 
are closely intertwined.42
However, the content of the decisions that the subject makes with respect 
to her property is not relevant in classical liberalism,
 
43 nor is the type of 
identity that the subject constructs with these decisions.  The subject of the 
right to property in classical liberalism is an abstract, disembodied subject.  
In classical liberalism, all that matters is protecting and enhancing the 
power characteristic of the members of the human species:  autonomy.44
Nevertheless, the relationship of domination over an object protected by 
the classical liberal right to property implies obligations for third parties.
  In 
issues of property, this involves creating the conditions for individuals to 
obtain and protect the goods they consider valuable for their life plans.  The 
liberal state does not aim to intervene in society so that all people become 
owners.  It only intervenes to create and apply the legal and political 
framework that allows individuals to acquire and maintain the properties 
they deem valuable through their own efforts.  The principle of equality in 
this property system can therefore be interpreted as formal equality.  All 
individuals can become owners and all owners are equal before the law.  
Equality is thus a function of autonomy.  Without the recognition and 
protection of property, people could not choose, transform, or realize their 
life plans. 
45
 
 40. Id.  
  
 41. Eric Mack, Self-Ownership and the Right of Property, 73 MONIST 519, 522–23 
(1990). 
 42. See JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 66 (1988). 
 43. LOMASKY, supra note 38, at 84–110. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and the Rule of Law:  Classical Liberalism 
Confronts the Modern Administrative State (Aug. 5, 2009) (Hoover Inst. Task Force on 
Prop. Rights), http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website
__academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ec
m_pro_062726.pdf. 
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The owner has a right-duty that imposes obligations to both the state and 
others.  The state has negative and positive obligations.  It must refrain from 
any act that affects the decisions made by the individual over his property 
and must act to protect the property of its citizens and to resolve conflicts 
that arise over property rights or between them and the public interest.  In 
the Constitution of 1886, this duty is evident in the right of the state to 
expropriate property when it conflicts with the principle of public use.46
However, this notion of subject (autonomous and abstract) presupposes 
the separation between the public sphere and the private sphere.
  
Individuals, meanwhile, have a duty to refrain from interfering with the 
property of others.  The subjective right to property then manifests in two 
ways:  duties of omission, which are the rule, and duties of action, which 
are the exception.  Consequently, the subjective right to property is a 
relational right.  It implies and regulates the interactions of the right to 
property held by individuals and the state. 
47  The first 
is the domain of justice, the space where the basic structure of the 
community is decided, political power is distributed, and the criteria for 
allocating scarce resources are agreed upon by the members of the polity.  
The second is the domain of morality, the area where the individual 
constructs, transforms, and tries to realize her life plan.  Classical liberalism 
situates property in the private sphere.  The individual, in the privacy of the 
home, makes decisions that seem relevant to her property.  The main task of 
the state must therefore be ensuring the right of the subject to be left alone.  
The state should intervene only to create the legal and political framework 
that will protect property and allow for resolving the conflicts that arise 
around it.  Hence the typical subject-owner of classical liberalism is also an 
isolated subject.48
 
 46. The Constitution states:  
  Social relationships represent a risk to her property and 
autonomy.  The best way to protect this principle and right is therefore to 
keep a safe distance from other individuals.  This is also why the classical 
liberal property right is fundamentally a negative right.  Finally, this is why 
the principle of solidarity does not play a role in defining or exercising the 
classic liberal right to property.  The interdependence between people is 
irrelevant to the property system that defends this political perspective.  
Property is a function of autonomy.  Property is important for the role it 
plays in expressing and facilitating the realization of individuals’ moral 
projects.  From this perspective, the “other” only appears as a limit to the 
right to property. 
When in the application of a law enacted for the public welfare there should result a 
conflict between private rights and a recognized necessity for that law, private interests 
shall yield to public interests.  But for any expropriations which it may be necessary to 
make there shall be given full indemnity . . . .  
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA  (1886) art. 31 (W.M. Gibson trans., 1948). 
 47. See generally Gerald F. Gaus, Public and Private Interests in Liberal Political 
Economy, Old and New, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 183 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus 
eds., 1983). 
 48. See Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY:  READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 165, 165–80 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne 
Kennedy eds., 1991) (examining the type of subject presupposed by classical liberalism). 
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The triumph of the classical liberal property system in Colombia was tied 
to the political and military struggles between centralists and federalists, 
liberals and conservatives, which characterized the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  This legal framework emerges as a consequence of the 
political and military success of the Regeneration movement.  This political 
movement, led by Rafael Núñez and Miguel Antonio Caro, had three 
primary objectives:  strengthening the Colombian nation-state around a 
conservative ideology on social and cultural issues;49 restoring order and 
ensuring the political stability that was lost with the wars between 
centralists and federalists;50 and strengthening the country’s emerging 
market economy.51
The imagined political community constructed during the Regeneration 
revolved around the idea that the Colombian state should reflect and protect 
the element that supposedly characterized the nation:  Catholicism.
 
52  The 
Constitution of 1886 thus declared Catholicism to be the religion of the 
Colombian state.53  Núñez and Caro believed that social cohesion should be 
achieved through the state’s defense of the elements that constituted the 
ethos of the nation.54  Similarly, the Regeneration structured the Colombian 
state around a monistic liberal interpretation of the state and the economy.55  
The Constitution of 1886 created a legal and political order that was 
centralized politically and decentralized administratively.56  Similarly, the 
Constitution established a strong presidential system that recognized 
classical individual liberties but limited them in accordance with law and 
the public interest.57  The social and cultural conservatism of the 
Regeneration intersects with its authoritarian political liberalism.  Similarly, 
these two features intersect with its economic liberalism:  the Constitution 
of 1886 establishes a market economy in Colombia.58
The classical liberal property system that was constructed with the 
Constitution of 1886 and the Civil Code of 1887 played a fundamental role 
in the political project of the Regeneration.  The individualistic concept of 
 
 
 49. See generally Jorge Orlando Melo, La Constitución de 1886, in 1 NUEVA HISTORIA 
DE COLOMBIA 43 (Jorge Orlando Melo & Jesús Antonio Bejarano eds., 1989). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Jorge Orlando Melo González, Las vicisitudes del modelo liberal (1850-1899), 
in HISTORIA ECONÓMICA DE COLOMBIA 135, 175–80 (José Antonio Ocampo ed., 2007) 
(describing the economic changes in Colombia beginning in 1878). 
 52. HERNANDO VALENCIA VILLA, CARTAS DE BATALLA:  UNA CRÍTICA DEL 
CONSTITUCIONALISMO COLOMBIANO 140–48 (1987). 
 53. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) arts. 38–41 (W.M. Gibson 
trans., 1948). 
 54. The other element was language.  For the Regeneration, Spanish was a fundamental 
component of the nation’s ethos.  Yet, there is no explicit reference to Spanish in the 1886 
Constitution. 
 55. For a detailed analysis of the concept of legal monism and the values it defends, see 
Libardo Ariza Higuera & Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Estudio preliminar to SALLY ENGLE 
MERRY, JOHN GRIFFITHS & BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, PLURALISMO JURÍDICO 19 (2007). 
 56. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 1, tit. XVIII (W.M. 
Gibson trans., 1948). 
 57. Id. tit. III. 
 58. Id. arts. 19, 31–35, 37, 44. 
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property allowed a formal break with the incipient capitalist system, 
centered on plantations, which still existed in much of Colombia in the late 
nineteenth century.59  A market economy is not possible without the 
circulation and use of property.  In particular, in an agrarian society like 
Colombia in the second half of the nineteenth century, it was not possible to 
create a capitalist economy without the free and easy transfer of land 
between citizens.60
The project of the Regeneration is differentiated from the federalist 
project imposed by the Constitution of 1863 in a notable fashion.  The 
presidentialism, centralization of legal and political power, state 
identification with the Catholic religion, and the limited nature of individual 
rights that characterize the Constitution of 1886 contrast with the 
institutional priority of the legislative branch,
  Nor was this economic system possible in Colombia 
entering the twentieth century without the exploitation of this resource to 
produce the surplus of raw materials necessary for the country’s industrial 
development.  However, this free circulation and operation of land needs 
the recognition and demarcation of the right to property by the state and 
therefore its legal and political protection.  The security and stability of the 
right to property are necessary for the proper functioning of any market 
economy. 
61 the federal structure,62 the 
separation of church and state,63 and the recognition and broad protection of 
individual rights that characterize the Constitution of 1863.64  Nevertheless, 
there remain some important constants between the two projects.  The 
continuities between the Radical Olympus65 and the Regeneration are also 
significant.66  The traditional historiography, which focuses on the 
differences between the liberal party and the conservative one in 
interpreting the second half of the nineteenth century in Colombia, obscures 
these continuities.67
However, each project has a different interpretation of the content of 
these components and their priority.  The Regeneration is primarily an 
authoritarian liberal project that interprets liberal principles in a 
  Formally, both projects are committed to democracy, 
the tripartite division of public power, individual rights, and the market 
economy.  These values, principles, and institutions are reflected in the 
Constitution of 1863 and that of 1886.  Both political projects are therefore 
committed to central components of liberalism.  The two political projects 
are part of the liberal family. 
 
 59. Marco Palacios, La Regeneración ante el espejo liberal y su importancia en el siglo 
XX, in MIGUEL ANTONIO CARO Y LA CULTURA DE SU ÉPOCA 261 (Rubén Sierra Mejía ed., 
2002). 
 60. Id. 
 61. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE COLOMBIA (1863) ch. 6 (W.M. 
Gibson trans., 1948). 
 62. Id. arts. 1, 36. 
 63. Id. arts. 15(16), 23. 
 64. Id. sec. 2. 
 65. The political movement behind the federalist project of 1863 was called the Radical 
Olympus. 
 66. Palacios, supra note 59, at 268–72. 
 67. Id. 
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conservative manner and occasionally departs from some of them, as in the 
case of the principle of separation of church and state.68  Its primary 
objective is to ensure order and institutional stability.  In contrast, the 
radical project reflects the classical liberal ideals well known in Latin 
America in the second half of the nineteenth century.  Its primary objective 
is defending the principle of autonomy.  The continuities between the two 
models become clearer when considering that the Civil Code issued by 
Congress in 1887 for the Unitary Republic of Colombia was the same code 
issued in 1873 for the United States of Colombia.  Influenced by French 
liberalism, Bello’s code regulates the relations between individuals in 
Colombia in both political models.  In both, moreover, the code is the 
center of the legal order.  In the two political projects, the right to property 
plays a fundamental role and is justified from a classical liberal 
perspective.69
Nevertheless, to understand the role played by the property system in the 
political project of the Regeneration, it is important to examine the position 
of the civil law within the legal system and the concept of the Constitution 
that this political perspective defended.  For the Regeneration, as well as a 
good part of the continental liberal legal tradition, civil law is the core of 
the legal system.  The Civil Code, the core of civil law, regulates all matters 
concerning relations between individuals.  It is all-inclusive.  The code also 
consists of a set of general and abstract norms.  The equality and freedom of 
citizens are thus guaranteed.  The civil legal norms apply to all citizens and, 
in principle, have an “eternal vocation.”
  The autonomy and formal equality of citizens, along with 
the protection of private property, become the axes around which 
Colombian law revolves.  The norms governing relations between 
individuals become the pillar of the legal order.  The fundamental contents 
of the Napoleonic Civil Code are not different from the basic contents of 
the Colombian Civil Code and therefore the legal system of the 
Regeneration. 
70
 
 68. In relation to this issue, however, the Constitution of 1886 tries to find a balance 
between conflicting values.  Article 40 recognizes freedom of worship, provided it not 
violate Christian morality, and Article 38 states that Catholicism, as the religion of the 
majority of Colombians, must be protected by the state.  Nevertheless, Article 38 also 
indicates that Catholicism is not an official religion, stating,  
  The code is a creation of reason.  
However, it is also a creation of the will.  In liberal political communities, 
The Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion is the religion of the Nation.  The public 
authorities shall protect it and cause it to be respected as an essential element of the 
social order.  It is understood that the Catholic Church is not and shall not be an 
established Church, and it shall preserve its independence.  
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 38 (W.M. Gibson trans., 1948). 
 69. The classical liberal property system of the Regeneration is therefore in tension with 
its conservative interpretation of the liberal canon on cultural and social matters, particularly 
with the strong influence of the church in public and private issues.  In other matters such as 
women’s rights, however, the Civil Code fits well with the conservative Catholic values of 
the Regeneration. 
 70. Napoleon noted to this effect, “‘My true glory is not that I have won forty battles.  
Waterloo will blow away the memory of these victories.  What nothing can blow away, what 
will live eternally is my Civil Code.’” Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of 
Codification, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1078–79 (1988). 
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legal norms should be a product of both reason and the will of the people.71
Yet, in the balance of the Colombian political community, as imagined 
by the Regeneration, the will is subordinate to reason.  The Civil Code 
adopted by the Colombian Congress is a copy of the Chilean Civil Code, 
which was in turn strongly influenced by the Civil Code of Napoleon.  
Without accepting that the code was primarily a result of reason, it would 
be very difficult to understand how it could be imported from France to 
contexts as diverse as the Colombian or Chilean.
  
Consequently, Congress should endorse the codes so that they can enjoy 
democratic legitimacy.  Marginalizing reason in the lawmaking process 
implies allowing the whim of the majority to be imposed.  Regardless of the 
content of the decision made, the legal norm must be understood as valid.  
Marginalizing will implies that the legal norm created does not have 
democratic legitimacy.  The political community would be heteronomous. 
72
The central character of civil law in the Colombian legal system goes 
hand in hand with a concept of a weak Constitution.
  The idea that the Civil 
Code is complete, coherent, and univocal is widely rooted in the Latin-
American legal imagination.  The argument that Latin America is part of 
the Roman-Germanic legal tradition is not sufficient to justify the transplant 
of a norm as important as the Civil Code.  The differences of context would 
require changes between the French and Latin American norms.  Variations 
in social, cultural, economic, and political issues create different kinds of 
needs and normative commitments that would require a distinct civil code 
for Latin America. 
73  From this point of 
view, the Constitution is exclusively a political program.  It is not a legal 
norm with immediate and direct application.  Hence, the Regeneration 
included Article 52 in the Constitution of 1886, which affirms, “The 
provisions contained in this title [of Civil Rights and Social Guarantees] 
shall be incorporated in the Civil Code as a preliminary title and may not be 
altered except by an act amending the Constitution.”74
 
 71. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW ch. 1 (1999). 
  Civil law is supreme 
in the legal system of the Regeneration, not the Constitution.  The 
constitutional provisions are only applicable when Congress develops them 
by means of a law.  Thus, with Article 52, the Regeneration ensures the 
application of civil rights and situates civil law at the heart of Colombia’s 
legal and political order.  The Constitution remains tied to the Civil Code.  
This interpretation of the Colombian legal order is consolidated in Article 6 
of Law 153 of 1887, which states, “An express provision of a law 
subsequent to the Constitution is deemed constitutional, and shall be 
 72. On this subject Portalis says, “Statutes are universal reason, the supreme reason 
based on the nature of things. Statutes are or should be the law reduced to positive rules.” 
JEAN ETIENNE MARIE PORTALIS, DISCURSO PRELIMINAR AL CÓDIGO FRANCÉS 10–11 (1997). 
 73. VALENCIA VILLA, supra note 52, at 145–46. 
 74. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) art. 52 (W.M. Gibson trans., 
1948). 
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applied even when it seems contrary to the Constitution.”75  The law (la 
ley) is then presumed constitutional.76  This presumption cannot be 
questioned.  The Constitution of 1886 did not grant the Supreme Court 
powers for the control of constitutionality, and in the ruling of September 
14, 1889, the Court accepted that it did not have the power to declare the 
norms created by the national Congress to be unconstitutional.77  
Consequently, Article 10 of the Civil Code, which indicates that 
contradictions between the Constitution and the law should be resolved in 
favor of the former, is only a paper rule.  Even though the constitutional 
reform of 1910 granted the Supreme Court judicial review powers,78 in 
practice the law remained supreme in the legal order.  The Supreme Court 
certainly declared a number of laws to be unconstitutional between 1910 
and 1991.  However, the legal community still considered civil law to be 
the core of the legal system and the Constitution a norm with no direct and 
immediate application.  The legal culture did not begin to shift on this 
matter until the issuance of the Constitution of 1991.79
In sum, this first period in the recent history of property in Colombia is 
structured around the autonomy of owners.  In this legal framework, the 
state should intervene only to recognize the right to property and to ensure 
its protection.  The state should not cross the line separating the public 
sphere from the private sphere.  Owners should be left alone so they can 
make the decisions that they deem necessary with respect to their property.  
Property, as well as the market, forms part of the sphere where individuals 
construct and realize their life plans.  The state should only intervene to 
create and maintain the legal and political conditions that allow the free 
play of supply and demand.  This property system is reinforced by the 
central role played by civil law in the Colombian legal system.  The Civil 
Code is the core of the legal system.  The Constitution, by contrast, is 
interpreted as a political program that has no immediate application.  The 
Constitution is not ultimately a legal norm that can generate immediate and 
direct consequences for citizens.  It is necessary that the law regulate it so 
that it can have an impact on society.  The law is supreme in the classical 
French liberal order of the Regeneration. 
 
II.  THE MIXED SYSTEM OF PROPERTY:  CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 
AND INTERVENTIONIST LIBERALISM 
The second key period for understanding the history of the right to 
property in Colombia has as its main components Legislative Act 1 of 1936, 
the Civil Code of 1887, Law 200 of 1936, Law 9 of 1989, and the Supreme 
 
 75. L. 153/87, agosto 28, 1887, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 7151 & 7152, art. 6; see Rodolfo 
Arango, La construcción de la nacionalidad, in MIGUEL ANTONIO CARO Y LA CULTURA DE SU 
ÉPOCA, supra note 59, at 125, 150. 
 76. Arango, supra note 59, at 125, 150. 
 77. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Plena septiembre 14, 
1889. 
 78. Legislative Act 3/10, octubre 31, 1910, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 14131, art. 41. 
 79. See infra notes 116–22 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s case law on property.  In this second phase, beginning in 1936 and 
ending in 1991, a classical liberal concept of property coexisted with a 
liberal interventionist one.  The concept of a subjective and nearly absolute 
right to property, which appears in Article 669 of the Civil Code, coexisted 
with the concept of property as a social function that enters the Colombian 
legal system with Legislative Act 1 of 1936, is consolidated with Law 200 
of 1936, and developed with Law 9 of 1989.  This conflict is also made 
explicit in the content of Article 10 of Legislative Act 1.  Article 10 defines 
property as both a right and as a social function.  The conceptual tension is 
then manifested in three areas of the legal system:  in the Constitution itself, 
between the Constitution and the law, and between two laws in the same 
hierarchy.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s case law on property does 
not resolve these structural conflicts in the Colombian legal system, but 
reproduces them. 
The process of transition from a classical liberal property system to the 
mixed system, classical liberal and liberal interventionist, began with 
Legislative Act 1 of 1936.  Article 10 of this act defines property as a social 
function, allows for expropriation for reasons of social interest (not just for 
public use), and allows for expropriation without compensation for reasons 
of equity when an absolute majority of the Senate and House of 
Representatives votes in favor of the measure.80
 Private property and other rights legally acquired in accordance with 
the civil laws by natural or juridic persons shall be guaranteed, nor may 
they be disavowed by later laws.  When the enforcement of a law passed 
for reasons of public utility or social interest conflicts with the rights of 
individuals, private interests must give way to the public or social 
interests. 
  The new Article 26 of the 
Constitution therefore introduced several elements in the Colombian 
property system.  However, these new components of the legal framework 
of property did not repeal the rules established by the Regeneration.  
Congress simply broadened the original text of Article 31.  It did not fully 
transform it.  The property system established by the Constitution of 1886 
survived the reform of 1936.  The text of Article 26 of the Constitution 
remained as follows after its amendment: 
 Property is a social function which implies obligations. 
 For reasons of public utility or social interest, as defined by the 
legislature, property may be expropriated by judicial decree with prior 
indemnification. 
 Nevertheless, the legislature, for reasons of equity, may deny 
indemnification by means of an absolute majority vote of the members of 
both Houses.81
Article 26 is therefore contradictory.  It simultaneously defines property 
as a right and a social function.  Property is simultaneously a subjective and 
 
 
 80. Legislative Act 1/36, agosto 5, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23263, art. 10. 
 81. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA (1886) (amended 1936), art. 26 
(W.M. Gibson trans., 1948). 
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nearly absolute individual right and an obligation that is imposed on the 
subject as a consequence of the interdependence between members of a 
society.  In the first concept of property, an individual holds a title that 
creates obligations toward third parties.  In the second, the individual does 
not have any rights over her property.  She has a duty to use it to generate 
benefits for society.  The state only has an obligation to protect property 
when it fulfills its social function.  The same contradiction exists between 
the constitutional concept of property as social function and Article 669 of 
the Civil Code.  The constitutional reform of 1936 does not transform the 
civil norms on property. 
This contradiction was furthered with the issuance of Law 200 of 1936 
and Law 9 of 1989.  Law 200, enacted a few months after the constitutional 
amendment, had the main objective of redistributing rural land in 
Colombia.  This legal norm aimed to design and implement agrarian reform 
in the country.82  To that end, Law 200 defined property as a social 
function,83 granted the executive the tools to seize ownership of lands that 
were not being operated by their owners,84 allowed for the adverse 
possession of vacant lands that were occupied in good faith,85 and created 
the institutional and procedural tools (judges and land processes) to resolve 
conflicts related to the use, holding, and possession of land.86  Law 9, on 
the other hand, sought to regulate the management and growth of 
Colombian cities as well as the distribution of land and the protection of 
public space.87  One of its specific objectives was regulating the 
expropriation of urban property not meeting its social function.88
It is not surprising that a complex legal order such as the Colombian one 
would have some contradictions.  Among other reasons, the enormous 
number of norms that make up the system and the ideological differences 
  
Therefore, Law 9 develops the concept of property as a social function that 
appears in Article 26 of the Constitution (amended by Legislative Act 1).  
However, the Congress that passed the law did not even mention Article 
669 of the Civil Code or the first paragraph of Article 26 of the 
Constitution, which define property as an individual right.  Congress did not 
address the contradiction between the two concepts of property that 
coexisted in the legal system. 
 
 82. Paulo Bernardo Arboleda Ramírez, La concepción de la propiedad privada 
contenida en la ley de tierras de 1936, 38 REVISTA FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS 
POLÍTICAS 97 (2008). 
 83. Article 1 of Law 200 of 1936 states that “it is presumed that they are not vacant lots 
but private property, owned by private estates, understanding that such a possession consists 
of the economic exploitation of the land by positive acts of ownership, such as plantation or 
fields, the occupation with cattle and others of equal economic importance.” L. 200/36, 
diciembre 30, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23388, art. 1. 
 84. See id. art. 6. 
 85. See id. art. 12. 
 86. See id. art. 26. 
 87. L. 9/89, enero 11, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 38650, chs. 1 (planning of municipal 
development), 2 (public space), and 3 (acquisition of property by voluntary selling or 
expropriation). 
 88. See id. art. 79. 
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among legislators can easily generate these failures of legislative technique. 
In fact, the legal systems include institutional arrangements that allow for 
solving these contradictions.  One of them is judicial review.  This power 
allows the courts to contribute to maintaining the coherence of the legal 
system.  Nevertheless, the Colombian Supreme Court did not fulfill this role 
in relation to the property system that was dominant between 1936 and 
1991.  The Supreme Court, which had judicial review powers, ruled on 
issues related to the social function of property ten times.89  In its case law, 
the Court developed the concept of property as a social function and 
protected the powers of the state to regulate and restrict the right to 
property.  However, the Supreme Court has not articulated an interpretation 
that would eliminate the contradictions in the property system in any of the 
rulings.  In its case law, the Supreme Court simply recognizes and 
reproduces those contradictions.  Two rulings are particularly important on 
this issue.  The first is the decision of August 11, 1988 in which the 
Supreme Court asserted the constitutionality of Article 669 of the Civil 
Code.90
 There is no doubt that in the text of the Constitution the individualist 
theory is discarded and a thoroughly social content is given to ownership, 
which allows the law to impose limitations to situate it in this way, to 
serve community interest and social solidarity, being therefore illicit those 
acts involving abnormal exercise of that right, or contrary to the economic 
or social purposes thereof, or those who tend to be or are determined by 
the desire to harm others without any real interest for the owner . . . . 
  The Court recognized the incompatibility of the concepts of 
property as a right and property as social function in this ruling.  However, 
it stated that the adverb “arbitrarily,” which qualifies how an owner can use 
her property, does not violate Article 26 of the Constitution, which 
established the social function of property.  In this respect the Court 
indicated, 
 [However] . . . [t]he arbitrary qualifier, which is given to the norm of 
the right to property [in Article 669 of the Civil Code] in question, is 
tempered by the same disposition for the prohibition by which in its 
 
 89. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], mayo 20, 1936, M.P: Eduardo 
Zuleta Ángel (principle of good faith and the exercise of rights); Corte Suprema de Justicia 
[C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], diciembre 12, 1936, M.P: Eduardo Zuleta Ángel (principle of 
good faith and contracts); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], febrero 21, 
1938, M.P: Arturo Tapias Pilonieta (abuse of rights and expropriation); Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], marzo 10, 1938, M.P: Juan Francisco Mujica (social 
function of property and unconstitutionality of civil law); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] 
[Supreme Court], marzo 24, 1939, M.P: Ricardo Hinestrosa Daza (abuse of rights in civil 
law; explicitly cites Duguit); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], marzo 24, 
1943, M.P: Aníbal Cardozo Gaitán (Law 200 of 1936, unproductive lands and the social 
function of property); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], septiembre 14, 
1989, M.P: Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein (examines constitutionality of Law 9 of 1989); Corte 
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], septiembre 28, 1989, M.P: Dídimo Páez 
Velandia (same); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], noviembre 9, 1989, 
M.P: Fabio Morón Díaz (same); and Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 
noviembre 9, 1989, M.P: Jairo Duque Pérez (same). 
 90. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Plena agosto 11, 1988, 
M.P: Jairo Duque Pérez. 
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exercise violates the law or the rights of others, all of which implies that it 
is not an absolute power as noted, and should thus be marked within the 
limits the legislature may specify.  Note also that the meaning of the 
adverb “arbitrarily” should be understood as that of “arbitrio” 
[discretion], i.e., according to the Dictionary of the Royal Academy of 
Language, “power that man (in this case the holder of the right) has to 
adopt a resolution with preference to another” and not that of the abuse 
that could result from a cursory reading of Article 669 of the civil code.91
Surprisingly, after recognizing the Constitution’s commitment to the 
concept of property as function, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Article 669 of the Civil Code, appealing to the 
dictionary of the Royal Academy of Language to state that the word 
“arbitrio” (discretion) could be differentiated from a common 
understanding of “arbitrarily.”  In doing so, the Court lost sight of the 
conceptual problem it faced.  There is no difference between leaving the use 
of property to the “discretion” of the property owner and permitting him or 
her to use it “arbitrarily.”  Ultimately it is the will of the owner that 
determines what should be done with her property.  The individual using 
“discretion” may decide to use the asset “arbitrarily.”  In both cases, of 
course, individual autonomy has limits.  The point is that these limits, from 
the perspective of the classical liberalism that supports the Civil Code, are 
external.  Yet, from the perspective of the concept of property grounded in 
solidarity, the problem is not that the owner has a right to use his good with 
discretion and that the legislature in turn has the right to impose restrictions 
on ownership.  The problem is that property as a social function imposes 
obligations on how an owner may use her property even if it does not 
adversely affect third parties.  Property has internal limits.  The owner, in 
this way, does not have an individual right over his or her good.  The owner 
fulfills a social function.  The Supreme Court thus did not realize that the 
conflict examined is not semantic and cannot be resolved by referring to the 
dictionary. 
 
The second ruling is that of September 14, 1989.  In this decision, the 
Supreme Court declared constitutional the power that Law 9 of 1989 gave 
the government to expropriate urban property not complying with its social 
function.92
 
 91. Id.  
  In the ruling, the Court recognized the origin and existence of 
 92. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], septiembre 14, 1989, M.P: 
Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein.   This decision reinforced principles that the Court had articulated 
in its ruling of December 3, 1937.  There, the Court said that  
this criterion based on the double interest, social and individual, the laws impose new 
rational limits every day to the arbitrary exercise of the absolute right of ownership, as 
had been established in the old definition from the civil code, and thus may require the 
owner to cultivate them, as the title of ownership carries the implicit obligation to use 
one’s right to perform a social activity, in the sense of solidarity that leads to the growth 
of general wealth and the common good. 
Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Plena diciembre 3, 1937, M.P: 
Hugo Palacios Mejía. 
  Similarly, in the ruling of March 10, 1938, the Court said, “Under Article 31 of the 
Constitution, which assigns property a social function, private property has been relativized 
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the contradiction in the property system but did not resolve it.  In this regard 
the Court said, 
 It is well known that the Legislative Act No. 1 of 1936 introduced in 
Article [26] of the Constitution the concept that “property is a social 
function that implies obligations.”  As argued in the process of the 
constitutional reform, it might have been better to express that property is 
a right that has a social function, which fits with the natural law theory 
that guided the drafting of the National Constitution of 1886, instead of 
opting for Duguit’s thesis, so in vogue in the thirties, that sought to reduce 
rights to social functions.  In this case, though, adopting either 
philosophical orientation leads to the same conclusion:  property must be 
used for a social purpose and not merely for the benefit of the individual 
property owner.93
The concrete solution to the case may be the same, as the Supreme Court 
suggests, but its basis varies considerably.  The fact that the Court did not 
even attempt to articulate an interpretation of the Constitution and the law 
that would have resolved the contradiction is remarkable since the ruling 
highlights the influence that the ideas of Duguit had in transforming the 
Colombian property system in 1936.  The Court, the legislators, and the 
executive of 1936 all knew Duguit’s work and were aware of the 
differences between the concepts of property as a right and property as 
social function.
 
94  For Duguit, property as a right and property as social 
function are two incompatible concepts.95  Duguit’s work challenges the 
individualist and natural law concept of property that has prevailed in the 
continental legal tradition.96  To Duguit, the main sources of this 
conception of property are Article 544 of the Civil Code of Napoleon and 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789.97
 
among us.  In this sense it is no longer an absolute right, ie., legally unassailable, as 
originally consigned in our civil code.” Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 
marzo 10, 1938, M.P: Ricardo Hinestrosa Daza. 
  The first defines 
property as an individual, subjective, and nearly absolute right; the second, 
as a natural right. 
 93. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], septiembre 14, 1989, M.P: 
Jaime Sanín Greiffenstein. 
 94. In the debate of November 20, 1936, Senator Rodríguez Moya affirmed:  
The term “social function of property,” rather than being interpreted as understood by 
liberalism, in the sense that the exercise of private ownership implies social burdens, 
more or less substantial, without being eliminated, is understood by the supporters of 
the project as the disappearance of the right, and substitution with a duty, in whose 
compliance the citizen has the protection of state powers, to the extent that it fulfills it, 
according to outdated and impractical theory, in the democracy of Auguste [Comte] and 
León Duguit.  
2 MARCO A. MARTÍNEZ, RÉGIMEN DE TIERRAS EN COLOMBIA:  ANTECEDENTES DE LA LEY 200 
DE 1936 “SOBRE REGIMEN DE TIERRAS” Y DECRETOS REGLAMENTARIOS 266 (1939).  Although 
Senator Rodríguez Moya was part of the Liberal Party, he decided to vote against the bill 
because it violated the values of classical liberalism. Id. at 265–66. 
 95. See generally LEÓN DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES DEL DERECHO PÚBLICO Y 
PRIVADO (Editorial Heliasta S.R.L. 1975). 
 96. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property:  Duguit, 
Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191 (2010). 
 97. DUGUIT, supra note 95, at 172. 
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For Duguit, this concept of property is based on a poor description of 
human beings.  “The isolated and independent man is pure fiction,”98 he 
wrote.  An adequate description of social reality makes man’s 
interdependence evident, not his individualism.  Human beings have similar 
and different needs and need to cooperate in order to satisfy those needs.  
For Duguit, solidarity is a fact, not a doctrine or principle.99  
Interdependence, which for Duguit is a synonym for solidarity, constitutes 
the social structure.  Similarly, it is the source of social cohesion.  For 
Duguit, individual needs are satisfied through the social division of labor.  
Every human being has a function in society.  Otherwise, “it would result in 
disorder or at least social harm.”100  Thus, for Duguit, property should not 
be thought of as a right having only external limits.  Property must be 
defined through the principle of solidarity and therefore as a social function.  
Consequently, property as a social function imposes obligations on the 
owner regarding her use of property.101
Duguit also redefines property as a social function by criticizing the 
category “subjective right.”
  Property has internal limits.  The 
owner must make productive use of her assets.  Assets should be at the 
service of society.  By property’s operation, the owner creates economic 
and social benefits that contribute to satisfying the needs of the members of 
the political community. 
102  For Duguit, this category, and its intimate 
connection with property, is another example of the metaphysical character 
of the continental legal systems.  From his perspective, the idea that having 
a right means that a third party has a corresponding duty is problematic.  
The notion of a right-duty implies the meeting of two wills in which one, 
stronger than the other, is imposed.  For example, my subjective right to 
property implies the duty of third parties to refrain from using it without my 
permission.  The notion of a subjective right therefore implies familiarity 
with the nature of the will, a standard to measure it, and a means to 
implement it.  Nevertheless, for Duguit, although we can know its external 
manifestations, we cannot know “the will.”  It cannot be known 
empirically.  Hence, “the notion of a subjective right is found [to be] totally 
ruined . . . .”103
Thus Duguit’s criticism of the right to property is based on a 
commitment to both positivism and structural functionalism.  Auguste 
Comte
  The right must be based on facts, not on metaphysical 
entities we cannot access through the scientific method. 
104 and Emile Durkheim105
 
 98. Id. at 178. 
 are the sources of the theory of property 
as social function.  Property as a right and property as social function are 
contradictory.  Consequently, the contradictions running through the second 
legal system of property in Colombia’s recent history cannot be resolved, as 
 99. See id. at 181. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 179. 
 102. Id. at 175. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 176. 
 105. Id. at 182. 
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the Supreme Court attempted, by appealing to the dictionary.  The argument 
that the Civil Code and the Constitution are not in conflict because the 
adverb “arbitrarily” used in Article 669 of the Civil Code really refers to the 
owner’s use of “discretion” is useless.  The Supreme Court began with an 
inadequate description of the problem it sought to solve. 
However, despite the theoretical contradictions, both the lawmakers of 
1936 and 1989 sought to attack the classical liberal concept of property in 
the Colombian legal order.106
 Property, as understood by the government, is not based solely on the 
registered title but also has its basis in the social function it plays, and 
possession consists in the economic use of land through the positive acts 
of those given the right to ownership, such as planting or sowing, the 
raising of cattle, the construction of buildings, enclosures and other 
equally significant things. . . .  For the government the fundamental 
problem of land is economic use, and considers that titles to private 
property must be clarified and justified before society, linking work to the 
land, or make way for the colonization of uncultivated areas that cannot 
continue being indefinitely sterile reserves, to the expectation of distant 
recovery which would arise from circumstances beyond the owners’ 
efforts.
  The legislature of 1936 wanted to replace the 
concept of property established in the Constitution of 1886 with the concept 
of property as a function.  In a message to Congress in 1935, to promote the 
enactment of Act 1, President López Pumarejo said: 
107
Similarly, Minister Dario Echandía, who presented the bill for 
Legislative Act 1 to Congress, summarized the purposes of constitutional 
reform as follows: 
 
 As you see, honorable Representatives, the project replaces the 
excessively individualistic conception of private rights that characterizes 
the current Constitution, with another that considers that individual rights 
must be exercised as a social function and should be limited by the public 
convenience.  The private right as a social function as opposed to the 
absolute private right:  such is the ultimate rationale of the project that the 
government submits for your consideration.108
Finally, the legislature of 1989 wanted to consolidate the changes that 
had been made by Legislative Act 1 and Law 200 in the urban context.  One 
of the main objectives of urban reform was to control owners protected by 
the classical liberal concept of property who did not use their property 
while waiting for housing market prices to improve.  Law 9 of 1989 
consolidated property as a social function, which was already part of the 
 
 
 106. Opposition to the project on the part of the conservative party was clear.  Esteban 
Jaramillo, former Minister of Finance, affirmed:  “[With the reform] an attack was carried 
out on religion, the family, against honor, against property and against the dearest affections 
born of man . . . the fundamentals of the country’s secular organization . . . have been 
threatened by destructive revolutionary tendencies.” Fernando Londoño, El Tiempo, El Siglo 
y la reforma constitucional de 1936, 4 CUADERNOS DE FILOSOFÍA Y LETRAS 213 (1981). 
 107. 1 MARTÍNEZ, supra note 94, at 14–15. 
 108. ALVARO TIRADO MEJÍA & MAGDALA VELÁSQUEZ, LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL DE 
1936, at 162 (1982). 
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Colombian legal order, by having its sight set on urban properties in the 
country. 
However, the three legal norms are part of a broader political project.  
Law 200, Legislative Act 1, and Law 9 were key instruments for the 
consolidation and development of the liberal interventionist state in 
Colombia.109  Interventionist liberalism was constitutionalized with the 
election of the Liberal Party in 1934110 and the commitment of President 
López Pumarejo to consolidating a strong interventionist state that would 
contribute to creating a fairer society in Colombia.  Prior to Legislative Act 
1 of 1936, the Colombian government had certainly intervened in the 
economy.  The state often intervened in the economy between 1886 and 
1936 to protect Colombian products.111  However, this intervention ran 
counter to the classical liberal principles supporting the Civil Code’s and 
the Constitution of 1886’s regulation of property.  With the 
constitutionalization of the interventionist state in 1936, the Colombian 
state was transformed from a minimally interventionist state on paper and a 
moderately interventionist role in practice to a continuous and systematic 
interventionist state on paper and in practice.  The political project of López 
Pumarejo gathered not only the ideas of Duguit and French solidarism on 
legal matters, but also the ideas advocated by John Maynard Keynes in 
economics and Franklin D. Roosevelt in politics.112
The consolidation of the interventionist state in Colombia is not a 
coincidence.  The liberal interventionist state was useful for the Colombian 
political elites of the 1930s and 1940s.  This type of state gave them the 
tools to address the impacts of the economic crisis of 1929, facing political 
challenges generated by the emergence of the working class in Colombia 
and confronting the notable levels of poverty and inequality facing the 
country.  The interventionist state was a convenient mechanism for the 
elites to address some of the needs of the subordinate classes, containing the 
influence of the leftist parties that represented them and protecting their 
own interests at the same time.  The interventionist state became a good 
strategy for maintaining the political and economic stability of the fragile 
Colombian liberal democracy.  Of course, this did not mean that López 
Pumarejo’s government was not truly committed to liberal interventionist 
 
 
 109. Law 9 was a key tool for developing the Colombian state’s commitments, acquired 
in 1936, to the principles of distributive justice and solidarity.  Indeed, after the 
interventionist state was made constitutional in 1936, the legislature issued a number of legal 
norms that gave the state power to intervene in areas as diverse as telecommunications, the 
family, and the export and import of goods and services.  However, Law 9 is of particular 
importance in this process in that it gives the state powers to intervene in a key area for any 
state committed to the material equality of its citizens:  the ownership of urban land. 
 110. The government of López Pumarejo was the second government of the period 
known in Colombia as the liberal hegemony (1930–46).  The first was that of Olaya Herrera 
(1930–34). BUSHNELL, supra note 10, at 181–200. 
 111. Melo González, supra note 51, at 175–80. 
 112. Catalina Botero Marino, La Intervención del Estado en la Economía:  Colombia 
1880–1936, 9 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 5, 60 (1996). 
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ideas.  It meant only that his government’s liberal reform was both 
normative and strategic.113
Property as a social function played a fundamental role in the political 
project of the consolidation and development of the interventionist state in 
Colombia.  The replacement of individualist property with property as a 
social function aimed to advance a profound redistribution of rural land in 
the country.  The land reform promoted by the Revolución en Marcha had 
the goal of expropriating the large unproductive estates in Colombia, 
allowing the peasant masses access to land and thus negating one of the 
primary causes of inequality and conflict in Colombia:  the unequal 
distribution of land.
 
114
Thus, for the political project that sought to consolidate and expand the 
interventionist state in Colombia, the reasoning behind property as a social 
function in Duguit’s work was irrelevant.  For López Pumarejo and Barco, 
what was relevant to Duguit’s theory was not the idea of interdependence as 
a social fact, but rather its relationship with the social division of labor or 
the objections to the metaphysical character of the concept of a subjective 
right.  The political project of these two liberal Presidents was not a 
commitment to Durkheim’s social theory or Comte’s positivism.  Duguit 
was relevant to this political project in that he provided the conceptual tools 
to challenge the classical liberal concept of property and to justify the 
state’s intervention in unproductive lands.  Thus, what the Colombian 
Congress did with Legislative Act 1, Law 200, and Law 9 was a 
reinterpretation of the liberal right to property.  The right to property, 
understood via the concept of “social function,” implies that owners have 
internal and external obligations.  The owner must use her good so that it 
generates benefits for the political community.  In particular, an owner must 
put her property in production in a way that generates economic and social 
returns that can benefit the community.  For the liberal majorities in 1936 
and 1989, property was not really a social function.  Property was an 
individual right that has a social function. 
  This process was furthered by Law 9 of 1989.  The 
urban reform law was designed and promoted by the liberal government of 
Virgilio Barco (1986–90).  In a context where the actions of the 
interventionist state had become the rule, the government of President 
Barco articulated a legal strategy for the state to redistribute urban land and 
the benefits generated by its operation. 
In this second property system, however, the autonomy of the owner was 
recognized and respected.  Property was a form through which individuals 
expressed their will, and this form allowed them to materialize their life 
plans.  Nevertheless, since Colombia was—and remains—an unequal 
society, the Congresses of 1936 and 1989 affirmed that property should be 
understood through the principle of solidarity.  Consequently, in this new 
property system, solidarity limited the autonomy of individuals.  However, 
solidarity was not understood in this context as a social fact but as a 
 
 113. VALENCIA VILLA, supra note 52, at 154–59. 
 114. Marino, supra note 112, at 48–54. 
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principle of political morality.  It referred to the duties that people have to 
support other members of society.  Similarly, this property system was 
committed to equality from both formal and substantial standpoints.  The 
issue was not only that all owners should be equal before the law but also 
that the state must act to ensure that all citizens, particularly the poorest, can 
become owners.  The state must intervene in the economy for redistributive 
purposes.  More specifically, in this context, it should expropriate all rural 
and urban properties not being used productively by their owners.  It should 
expropriate all property that does not meet the social function of property in 
a political community committed to the values of interventionist liberalism. 
Now, recognizing the objectives of the political project seeking to 
strengthen the interventionist state in Colombia and clarifying the use of 
Duguit’s theory of property as function does not remove the contradiction 
between property as a right and property as social function at the heart of 
Legislative Act 1.  Nor does it obviate the contradictions that the 
Legislative Act created when it preserved Article 669 of the Civil Code or 
issued Laws 200 of 1936 and 9 of 1989.  Making the policy objectives of 
the liberal interventionist project explicit did not obscure the fact that the 
Supreme Court, which could have contributed to resolving these 
contradictions, did not do so.  The second period in the recent history of 
Colombia’s right to property is then structured around a set of five 
conceptual oppositions:  property as a right–property as social function; 
individualism–solidarity; limited intervention–general intervention; 
private–public; and Constitution as political program–Constitution as norm.  
The first components of each of these oppositions come from the classical 
liberal property system that was established with the Constitution of 1886 
and that survived the reform of 1936 in the Civil Code and in the first 
paragraph of Article 31 of the Constitution.  The second components, with 
the exception of the category “Constitution as norm,” entered the 
Colombian legal order with Legislative Act 1, Law 200, and Law 9. 
In the two property systems, the separation between the public sphere 
and the private sphere was maintained.  The first was still the realm of 
justice; the second, the realm of morality.  However, in the liberal 
interventionist property system, the boundary between these two spheres 
shifted.  The state became entitled to intervene in decisions made by the 
owner, even if those decisions did not affect third parties.  Furthermore, the 
state’s intervention in the right to property was only one of the many areas 
where it acted for purposes of distributive justice and the material equality 
it is required to implement.  The individual to whom the interventionist 
state refers is both abstract and concrete.  The state must protect the rights 
of every individual to make decisions about his or her property, but is also 
obliged to intervene to ensure that people, flesh and blood citizens, have 
access to property. 
Similarly, the subject of the right to property in classical liberalism and 
interventionist liberalism remains an autonomous individual.  Property is 
still a means for the articulation and realization of an individual’s life plan.  
In the second model, however, the individual is not an isolated subject.  The 
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individual is conceived through his relationship with others and the 
principle of solidarity.  The subject of the right to property has positive 
obligations to other members of society.  He must not only refrain from 
adversely affecting the rights of others.  Understood not as a social fact but 
as a principle, solidarity also requires him to use his property productively.  
The right to property has a social function; it is not just an individual right 
limited by the rights of others.  The subject is a social being, not a monad 
coexisting with other monads in common physical space. 
Finally, this second property system coexisted with a thin concept of the 
Constitution.  The Constitution was still conceived as a political project that 
must be developed by the legislature in order to be effectively implemented.  
The law remained supreme in this second period of the recent history of 
property in Colombia.  Civil law, or the Civil Code in particular, was the 
core of the legal system.  The relationships between individuals, typical of 
the private sphere in which subjects construct their life plans and in which 
the market functions, were the fundamental reference points for the legal 
order.  The Constitution did not control the Civil Code.  The code 
dominated the Constitution.  Hence the liberal interventionist property 
system has had many obstacles to acceptance in Colombian legal culture.  
The classical liberal conception of property located in the Civil Code has 
dominated the legal and political imagination of Colombians.  For most 
citizens, property remains a nearly absolute individual right.  Colombian 
legal culture only moved toward a dense concept of the Constitution with 
the adoption of the Constitution of 1991.  Nevertheless, the debate 
generated by the case law of the Constitutional Court seeking to 
constitutionalize the private right demonstrates the challenges inherent in 
consolidating a concept of the Constitution as the supreme norm with direct 
and immediate application in the country’s legal culture.115
III.  THE LIBERAL INTERVENTIONIST PROPERTY SYSTEM (1991–2011) 
 
The third period in the recent history of property in Colombia is 
structured around the Constitution of 1991 and the Constitutional Court’s 
case law on property.116  Article 58 of the Constitution reiterates that 
property has a social function, that the state has the right to expropriate 
property for reasons of public utility as well as social interest, and that the 
state has an obligation to protect rights to justly acquired property.117
 
 115. NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO Y DERECHO PRIVADO:  EL DEBATE (Beatriz Espinosa Pérez 
& Lina Marcela Escobar Martínez eds., 2008). 
  
However, the Constitution also indicates that property has an ecological 
function, that the state has the duty to promote associational and collective 
forms of property, and that the state may expropriate property, whether by 
 116. Law 388 of 1997 amended Law 9 of 1989. L. 388/97, julio 24, 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL 
[D.O.] 43091.  Nevertheless, these changes did not affect the core elements of the social 
function of the right to property as articulated in Law 9. 
 117. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58 (Anna I. Vellvé Torras & Jefri 
J. Ruchti trans., 1991). 
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judicial or administrative means.118  Thus, although the Constitution of 
1991 includes important new elements in the property system, it also 
reproduces the contents of Article 10 of Legislative Act 1 of 1936, which in 
turn reproduced the contents of the Constitution of 1886.  The second and 
third periods in the recent history of property in Colombia are thus 
cumulative.119  They do not replace the previous system, but transform it in 
part.  In its classic and interventionist versions, liberalism remains constant 
under the legal framework regulating property in Colombia.120
In this way, and in the Civil Code that remained in effect after the 
issuance of the Constitution of 1991, the contradictions of the second 
property system are preserved in the third.  One important difference 
between the two systems, though, is that the concept of property as a social 
function, set out in Article 58 of the Constitution of 1991, is intertwined 
with three key elements in the structure of the dogmatic part of the 
Constitution:  the principle of solidarity, the definition of the Colombian 
state as a Social State of Law, and the principle of the supremacy of the 
Constitution.  These are not marginal differences.  The Constitution 
establishes in its first article that Colombia is a “social State of law” and 
recognizes solidarity as one of the principles underlying the Colombian 
State.
 
121
 
 118. Id. 
  The fourth article states that the Constitution is the supreme norm 
 119. The proposal presented by Jesús Pérez González-Rubio to the National Constituent 
Assembly illustrates the continuity between the two property systems:   
Free enterprise has its foundation in private property.  It is the cornerstone of the 
economy.  Hence the previous Constitution and the new one guarantee it as a right; but 
it can only be justified as such in the mind of the owner to the extent that it fulfills a 
social function.  It is an idea expressed with the following phrase from 1936 and now 
repeated:  “Property is a social function that implies obligations.” 
GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL No. 113, at 29. 
 120. Article 58 of the Constitution of 1991 indicates, 
  Private property and the other rights acquired in accordance with the civil laws 
are guaranteed, which cannot be ignored or infringed by subsequent laws.  When 
the application of a law passed on account of public utility or social interest should 
result in a conflict between the rights of persons and the necessity recognized [by 
the law], the private interest must concede to the public or social interest. 
  Property is a social function that implies obligations.  As such, an ecological 
function is inherent to it. 
  The State will protect and promote associative and collective [solidarias] forms 
of ownership. 
  For reasons of public utility or social interest defined by the legislator, there 
may be expropriation by means of a judicial sentence and prior indemnification.  
The latter will be determined in consultation with the interests of the community 
and the affected [party].  In the cases determined by the legislator, this 
expropriation may be pursued by administrative means, subject to subsequent 
contentious administrative action, including with respect to price. 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58 (alterations in original) (Anna I. Vellvé 
Torras & Jefri J. Ruchti trans., 1991). 
 121. Id. art. 1.  Article 2 of the Constitution states, “The essential goals of the State are:  
to serve the community, to promote the general prosperity, and guarantee the effectiveness 
of the principles, rights and duties consecrated in the Constitution . . . .” Id. art. 2. 
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of the legal system.122
In the past twenty years, the Constitutional Court has established a 
consistent line of case law in which the concept of property as a social 
function is developed and protects the powers of the state to enforce 
compliance by the owners.  In a set of ten rulings on abstract judicial 
review,
  Thus, property as a social function is not a concept 
isolated in the Constitution.  It is a significant part of the institutional 
machinery created by the National Constituent Assembly of 1990.  Property 
as a social function became a key tool for the strong interventionist state 
established in the Constitution of 1991 to fulfill its objectives in terms of 
redistributive justice.  This definition and these principles also play a key 
role in the case law of the Constitutional Court, which resolves the 
contradictions of the property system.  The case law of the Constitutional 
Court forms the second central difference between the second and third 
property systems. 
123 the Court has protected the right of the state to limit the right to 
property, given its social function in matters as diverse as the environment, 
mining, and the distribution of urban land.124
 
 122. Article 4 of the Constitution states, “The Constitution is the norm of norms.  In any 
case of inconsistency between the Constitution and the law or other legal norm, the 
constitutional provisions will be applied.” Id. art. 4. 
  In these rulings, the Court 
 123. The Court makes reference to the social function of property in just two rulings on 
the concrete control of constitutionality:  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
agosto 18, 1998, M.P: Alejandro Martínez Caballero, Sentencia T-427/98, and Corte 
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 12, 2001, M.P: Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, 
Sentencia T-746/01.  While the right to property is not a fundamental right, it cannot be 
protected by use of the action of tutela.  The action of tutela allows for protecting the 
fundamental rights of individuals from the improper acts or omissions of public officials.  In 
the two cases of tutela mentioned above, the Constitutional Court ruled on the right to 
property by making use of the so-called doctrine of connectedness.  The Court has held that 
in cases of tutela, an economic and social right can be addressed when it has a direct 
connection with a fundamental right. 
 124. The ten rulings and issues they address are as follows:  in the first ruling, the 
Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of Article 296 of the mining code, which 
provides for the termination of mining titles if they are not registered within one year after 
promulgation of the law. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 18, 1993, 
M.P: Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, Sentencia C-006/93.  In the second, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the second article of Law 9 of 1989, which requires that the plan of 
municipal development include regulations on the free mandatory cessions to which builders 
are subject. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 29, 1993, M.P: Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-295/93.  In the third, it declared constitutional Article 87 of Law 
135 of 1961, which states that rural properties of less than three hectares may not be 
subdivided. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 5, 1994, M.P: José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, Sentencia C-223/94.  In the fourth, it upheld the 
constitutionality of Article 79 of 1988, which indicates that cooperatives cannot pursue profit 
while fulfilling a social function. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
diciembre 7, 1995, M.P: Fabio Moron Díaz, Sentencia C-589/95.  In the fifth, it upheld the 
constitutionality of Article 3 of Law 48 of 1882, Article 61 of Law 110 of 1912, and Article 
65 of Law 160 of 1994, which define vacant public lands as inalienable. Corte 
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 7, 1995, M.P: Carlos Gaviria Díaz, 
Sentencia C-595/95.  In the sixth ruling, it declared Article 669 of the Civil Code to be 
unconstitutional. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99.  In the seventh, it declared that Article 217 of the 
national police code, which requires all owners to maintain the fronts of their houses or 
buildings, is constitutional. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 26, 
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defended a standard interpretation of the social function of property.  For 
the Court, it was clear that the concept of property as social function was 
introduced into the Colombian legal order with Legislative Act 1 of 
1936.125  Similarly, it was clear to the Court that in 1936, Congress and the 
National Constitutional Assembly took this concept from Duguit.126  In 
these decisions, the Constitutional Court recognized that property as a 
social function imposes internal limits on property.127
 
2002, M.P: Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, Sentencia C-491/02.  In the eighth, it upheld the 
constitutionality of the law governing the forfeiture of property. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], junio 5, 2003, M.P: Jaime Cordoba Triviño, Sentencia C-740/03.  In 
the ninth, it confirmed the constitutionality of Articles 86, 136, and 220 of the injunctive 
administrative code, which regulate the payment of indemnification that the state must 
provide when it permanently occupies an individual’s property. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], septiembre 7, 2004, M.P: Jaime Araújo Rentería, Sentencia 
C-864/04.  In the tenth, it declared that Article 13 of Law 2 of 1959, which prohibits the sale 
of private lands that have been included in national parks, is constitutional. Corte 
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 15, 2006, M.P: Rodrigo Escobar Gil, 
Sentencia C-189/06. 
  The Court indicated 
 125. In a 2003 ruling, the Court discussed the 1936 constitutional reform: 
  The reforms introduced to the system in Article 10 of Legislative Act No. 1 of 
August 5, 1936 were substantial:  i) First, the right to private property was 
expressly referenced.  ii) Second, the motives by which social interest prevails 
over private interest were incorporated.  iii) Third, a mandate was enacted by 
which “Property is a social function that implies obligations.”  iv) And fourth, the 
legislature was empowered to order, for reasons of equity, expropriation without 
previous indemnification.  These changes allowed for the definitive consolidation 
of Colombian constitutionalism, the foundations of the social state—based on 
solidarity, on the rationalization of economic relations, on the exercise of rights 
depending on the social context in which they are recognized, and committed to 
satisfying the primary needs of individuals.  Hence, the nucleus of the individual 
subjective right par excellence—property—was affected in the Constitution, by 
displacing the arbitrary rule exercised over the property by its use for the social 
demands of generation of wealth and social welfare. 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2003, M.P: Jaime Córdoba 
Triviño, Sentencia C-740/03. 
 126. On this point, the Constitutional Court has stated, 
The Court does not believe that, to resolve the lawsuit, an analysis should be done 
on the origins and development of the right to property through the centuries, 
given the existence of varied case law and doctrine on the subject, it was sufficient 
to remember that the concept of property has undergone change, as in principle it 
was seen as a natural and absolute right, then closely linked to the notion of 
freedom, due to which Sieyes affirmed that freedom was a property in itself.  
Subsequently, and with the passage of time, more credence was given to the 
thought of those who argued that property must yield to the social obligations of 
State and the community at large, leading to the thesis of property as a social 
function. León Duguit, whose thought greatly influenced the constitutional reform 
of 1936, an influence that survives in the notion gathered by the present 
Constitution, referred to the character of the property in these terms . . . . 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 29, 1993, M.P: Carlos Gaviria Díaz, 
Sentencia C-295/93. 
 127. The Constitutional Court has also stated that, 
The social function of property is incorporated into its contents to impose 
obligations on the owner for the benefit of society.  In other words, the social 
content of the obligations internally limits the individual content of the powers of 
the owner, according to Duguit’s concept of property as function.  In the case of 
vacant rural land, this social function is translated into an obligation to exploit it 
economically and to designate it exclusively for agricultural activities, not to use 
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that the owner has an obligation to make productive use of her property.128  
Consequently, the state has the right to regulate the use of different types of 
property to ensure that their social function is fulfilled.129
The second major contribution addressed how to confront the 
contradictions in the legal system between property as social function and 
property as a right.  Two rulings, which are complementary, are particularly 
relevant with respect to this point.  The first is the C-006 ruling of 1993, 
which precipitated the case law on property as social function.  In this 
decision, the Court undertook a thoughtful analysis of the conceptual 
differences between the concepts of property as a right and property as a 
social function.  For the Court, the main difference lay in the type of limit 
that each imposes on property.
  Similarly, the 
state has the right to regulate the consequences of the owner’s breach of 
social obligations.  As a consequence, the first major contribution of the 
Court on this matter was not on the content given to the institution of 
property as social function, but on its systematic and consistent application. 
130
 
the land if it is designated as a reserve or to conserve renewable natural resources, 
etc.  In one word, the social function is that the right to property must be exercised 
not to harm but to benefit society, designating or using it according to the 
collective needs and respecting the rights of others. 
  While the former imposes external 
limits, the second imposes internal limits.  In Colombia, the state must 
protect private property only when it is being used productively.  Similarly, 
in this ruling, the Court examined the political and economic objectives that 
intersect with each concept of property.  For the Court, it was clear that the 
change in the property system that occurred in 1936 was directly related to 
the economic changes in Colombia in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century.  Similarly, it was clear to the Court that the political 
objective of this change was related to the possibility of redistributing land 
in Colombia.  In this decision, the Court affirmed that property is a right 
that has internal and external limits.  In this regard, the Court says: 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 7, 1995, M.P: Carlos Gaviria 
Díaz, Sentencia C-595/95. 
 128. Id.  
 129. The Constitutional Court has said: 
In this order of ideas and defending the concept of social function, the legislator 
may impose on the owner a number of restrictions on ownership rights for the sake 
of preserving social interests, respecting, however, the core of the right itself, 
relative to the minimum level of enjoyment and disposition of a good that enables 
its holder to obtain economic benefits in terms of value for use or exchange value 
to justify the presence of a private interest in the property.  This is why property is 
protected by the Constitution in accordance with the analysis and the 
circumstances of each case, especially if found to be connected and related to other 
specific fundamental rights.  Given its social role, it should also be understood as a 
duty, as a formative and internal limit that commits owners to the duty of solidarity 
embodied in the Constitution. . . .  The legal configuration of property, then, can 
point either to the suppression of certain powers, to their conditional exercise, or 
in some cases, the forced exercise of certain obligations. 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1998, M.P: Alejandro 
Martínez Caballero, Sentencia T-427/98. 
 130. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero 18, 1993, M.P: Eduardo 
Cifuentes Muñoz, Sentencia C-006/93.   
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 Economic and social development is ultimately responsible for the 
mutation of the concept and the meaning that Colombian society has for 
and assigns to private property.  Beginning in the thirties, the laws 
enacted are inscribed under the marker of sociability as evidenced by their 
texts and the copious case law that has dealt with them, constantly 
referring to the categories of social interest and the social function of 
property.  The estrangement from the subjective matrix of the civil code is 
notorious and eloquently denounces a change in the economic base and 
the very foundation of the right to property, which is preserved and 
guaranteed, but by means of the constitutional principles of social interest 
and social function.  In this sense, the express involvement of the 
legislature in activities and important areas from private property to social 
interest has allowed it to maintain expropriatory measures to strengthen 
and facilitate programs of social and economic development, and to 
articulate policies of distributive justice through these means.  On their 
part, generally speaking, the intrinsic linkage of private property to social 
function has sought to subordinate ensuring the requirements of 
production and the generation of wealth.131
The second key ruling in the Court’s line of case law on property is 
C-595 of 1999.  In this ruling, the Court declared part of Article 669 of the 
Civil Code to be unconstitutional.
 
132  More specifically, the Court declared 
the adverb “arbitrarily,” which described how the owner could use his good, 
to be unconstitutional.  The argument for this decision is divided into three 
parts.  In the first part, the Court affirms that the concept of property as a 
social function established in the Constitution limits the autonomy of the 
owner.133  Therefore, the owner cannot use her property in any way that she 
deems appropriate.  The issue is not that the exercise of property has 
external limits.  Article 669 of the Civil Code indicates that the owner 
cannot use her property in a way that violates the law or the rights of others.  
The issue is that Article 58 of the Constitution redefines the concept of 
property.  The owner, by definition, has obligations related to her 
property.134
In the second part of the argument, the Court explicitly recognized that 
the concepts of property as a function and property as a right are 
  Not only should the owner not use it in a way that does not 
affect third parties, she also must use it productively. 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99. 
 133. Id. 
 134. The Court stated: 
Now, the entire theory of a subjective right was built, traditionally, keeping in 
mind the patrimonial right type par excellence:  property.  Analyzed with Duguit’s 
criteria, the right of ownership becomes a social function, which means that the 
owner is not a privileged subject, as he had been until that point, but an official, 
which is to say, someone who should manage that which he possesses as a 
function of social interests (which take prevalence over his own), a possession that 
is only guaranteed, in the individual sphere, if the objectives of collective benefit 
are met. 
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: Carlos Gaviria 
Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99. 
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contradictory.135  For the Court, the notion of a subjective right was 
incompatible with the notion of a social function.  After making an analysis 
of Duguit’s theory, the Court affirmed that the metaphysical character of the 
concept of a subjective right is irreconcilable with the concept of social 
function based on social facts.136  The Court therefore recognized that 
Article 58 of the Constitution contradicts itself.  However, the Court also 
recognized the utility of the concept of a subjective right and questions 
Duguit’s conclusion that it is necessary to expel it from legal discourse.137  
This argument is significant.  The Court recognized and understood the 
conceptual problem it faced.138  This argument contrasts with the one put 
forward by the Supreme Court in the 1988 ruling which reviewed the 
constitutionality of Article 669 of the code.139  In this ruling, as noted 
above,140
In the third part of the argument, the Constitutional Court argued that the 
best interpretation of Article 58 of the Constitution, which is contradictory, 
indicates that property is a right that has internal and external limits.
 the Supreme Court considered this article to be constitutional 
because the word “arbitrarily” actually signifies the “discretion” of the 
owner and is limited by law and the rights of others.  In the end, the 
Supreme Court considered that the social function of property is an external 
limit that the legislature imposes on owners.  The social function is a line 
that, like the rights of third parties, the owner should not cross.  For the 
Supreme Court, there was therefore no conceptual difference between 
property as function and property as a right. 
141
 
 135. Id. 
  The 
legislature’s objective was not to eliminate the notion of subjective rights 
from the Colombian legal system.  Congress’s objective was to redefine the 
right to property so it is understood that the owner has an obligation to use 
 136. In this regard the Court says, “From [Duguit’s] sociological positivism a supposition 
of this nature is repelled [that of the will], only understandable from a metaphysical 
perspective, incompatible with the scientific analysis of the right.  The conclusion, 
undoubtedly puzzling, is this:  ‘Subjective rights do not exist.’” Id. 
 137. The Court indicated in relation to this point, “Reconciling the notion of acquired 
subjective rights with that of social function of is a nearly impossible task . . . which 
highlights the difficulty created by dispensing with such a useful conceptual tool (the 
subjective right) in both legislation and theorizing about the law.” Id. 
 138. The Court affirmed: 
What seems clear is that the advice of any careful reader of the transcribed article 
would be incompatible with a highly individualistic stamp such as the one 
embodied in Article 669, particularly emphasized in the word arbitrarily, and the 
hermeneutic efforts made so artificial as to be innocuous in distinguishing two 
meanings:  capriciously, or according to discretion, and opting in this context to 
attribute the latter meaning to the adverb.  Both options preserve the individualistic 
conception underlying the norm in question, incompatible with the higher order 
provision incorporated in 1936, informed by a political philosophy specifically 
constructed against individualism. 
Id. 
 139. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala. Plena agosto 11, 1988, 
M.P: Jairo Duque Pérez. 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 141. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99. 
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her object productively.  The Court, citing the paragraph of Ruling C-006 of 
1993 that appears above,142 makes an analysis of the political and economic 
objectives for including the social function concept of property in the 
Colombian legal order.143
This third property system of Colombia’s recent history emerges from 
the consolidation and expansion of interventionist liberalism resulting from 
the broad agreement between liberal, conservative, and progressive forces 
in the National Constituent Assembly for reshaping the Colombian political 
community in 1990.  The NCA of 1991 was summoned to confront a deep 
political crisis in Colombia.
  In this analysis, the Court reiterates that this 
objective was the redistribution of land in Colombia.  In sum, what the 
Court affirms is that property in Colombia is not a social function, as 
Duguit argued, but a subjective right that has a social function.  The text of 
Article 58 is inconsistent.  However, a systematic and teleological 
interpretation of the Constitution can solve this contradiction. 
144  This crisis was caused primarily by two 
failings:  the state’s inability to curb the violence ravaging the country, and 
the existence of a corrupt, centralized, exclusionary, and inefficient political 
system.145  For the populace that supported the constitutional process, a 
radical change in the institutional organization of the state was needed to 
respond to widespread violence generated by drug lords, guerrilla groups, 
and paramilitary organizations.146  It was widely believed in the country 
that this drastic institutional change was necessary, moreover, to create an 
open, effective, and decentralized political system, in which the interests of 
all citizens would be represented.  It was also thought that this political 
system should be given broad powers to confront the profound injustices 
affecting a huge number of Colombians.  Consequently, the work of the 
NCA was structured around the following four issues:  putting an end to 
violence, strengthening democracy, expanding the Bill of Rights, and 
redefining the basic structure of the state.147
With respect to the latter, the NCA decided that Colombia should be a 
Social State of Law.  For the NCA, it was clear that the state should be 
obligated not only to protect the formal equality of citizens but also their 
material equality.  The state should therefore have the tools to intervene in 
the economy in a continuous and systematic manner.
 
148
 
 142. See supra text accompanying note 
  A little over fifty 
131. 
 143. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 18, 1999, M.P: Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, Sentencia C-595/99. 
 144. John Dugas, La Constitución Política de 1991: ¿un pacto político viable?, in LA 
CONSTITUCION DE 1991:  ¿UN PACTO POLITICO VIABLE? 15, 18 (John Dugas ed., 1993). 
 145. On the history of the NCA, see John Dugas, Rubén Sánchez & Elizabeth Úngar, La 
Asamblea Nacional Constituyente, expresión de una voluntad general, in LOS NUEVOS RETOS 
ELECTORALES:  COLOMBIA 1990:  ANTESALA DEL CAMBIO 187 (Rubén Sánchez David ed., 
1991). 
 146. JAIME BUENHAORA FEBRES-CORDERO, EL PROCESO CONSTITUYENTE:  DE LA 
PROPUESTA ESTUDIANTIL A LA QUIEBRA DEL BIPARTIDISMO 118–22 (1991). 
 147. See generally Dugas, supra note 144. 
 148. Article 334 of the Constitution states: 
  The general management of the economy will be under the responsibility of the 
State.  The latter will intervene, by mandate of the law, in the exploitation of the 
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years after being introduced in the Constitution with Legislative Act 1 of 
1936, the idea of an interventionist state in Colombia was well recognized 
and accepted by the public.149
In this institutional machinery, property as a social function fits perfectly.  
The regulation of property is essential to any political project that aims to 
reduce inequality.
  However, the constituent assembly of 1990 
strengthened it when it defined the Colombian state as a Social State of 
Law.  The differences between the constitutional reform of 1936 and the 
Constitution of 1991 are substantial.  In the first, Congress granted certain 
powers to the state to intervene in the economy; in the second, the state, by 
definition, must intervene to contribute continuously and in generalized 
fashion to realizing the objectives of material justice to which Colombian 
society is committed.  The idea of a strong interventionist state is further 
reinforced in the Constitution of 1991 with the introduction of the principles 
of solidarity and dignity into the Constitution.  Article 1 of the Constitution 
indicates that the Colombian state is based on solidarity and dignity.  The 
purpose of the robust interventionist state in Colombia, then, is to put the 
resources at its disposal to the service of realizing these principles. 
150
 
natural resources, in the use of the soil, the production, distribution, use, and 
consumption of goods, and in the public and private services in order to rationalize 
the economy with the purpose of achieving the improvement of quality of life of 
the inhabitants, the equitable distribution of opportunities and the benefits of 
development and the preservation of a healthy environment. 
  In a country like Colombia, moreover, this objective 
cannot be achieved without confronting the problem caused by the 
historically unjust distribution of rural and urban land and by the existence 
  In a special manner, the State will intervene to give full employment to the 
human resources and to ascertain that all the persons, in particular those with lower 
incomes, have effective access to the basic goods and services. Also, to promote 
the productivity and competitiveness and harmonious development of the regions. 
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P] art. 334 (Anna I. Vellvé Torras & Jefri J. 
Ruchti trans., 1991). 
 149. Article 11 of Legislative Act 1 of 1936, which transformed the Constitution of 1886, 
stated, “The State can intervene in the operation of industries or public and private 
companies through legislation, with the objective of rationalizing the production, distribution 
and consumption of wealth, or giving the worker the proper protection to which he is 
entitled.” Legislative Act 1/36, agosto 5, 1936, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 23263, art. 11. 
 150. On this subject, members of the Constituent Assembly Arias and Marulanda state in 
the bill they presented before the National Constituent Assembly, 
A party that believes in the intervention of the State in the economy and that has 
popular support can be found in this brief subsection we are addressing [“Everyone 
has a right to access property . . . .  The State shall promote access to property, in 
accordance with the law . . .”] and refers to the right of all people to access 
property, a legal source for acting on the issue of redistribution, complemented by 
other legal pieces such as expropriation, in the terms of this article and that will be 
explained subsequently. 
Iván Marulanda Gómez & Jaime Arias López, ARTÍCULO 58 DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991, at 
2 (Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango).  This volume gathers all the original documents about the 
right to property produced by the National Constituent Assembly. See also Francisco Rojas 
Birry, Proyecto de Reforma de la Constitución Política de Colombia, in GACETA 
CONSTITUCIONAL NO. 29, at 5 (1991); Jaime Arias López, Propiedad:  Proyecto de Acto 
Reformatorio de la Constitución Política de Colombia No. 77, in GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL 
NO. 23, at 219 (1991); Cornelio Reyes, El Derecho de Propiedad, una Disposición 
Anacrónica y Contradictoria, in GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL NO. 107, at 15 (1991). 
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of a significant amount of unproductive land.151  A Social State of Law 
must recognize that the right to property is not absolute, that owners are 
obliged to use their properties productively, and that the state must 
intervene in the event that this does not happen.152
Consequently, in this third system, property is defined based on the 
principles of material equality and solidarity.  Indeed, the autonomy of the 
owner continues to have considerable importance.  Property is a 
fundamental instrument for individuals to express and realize their life 
plans.  Nevertheless, individual autonomy is limited by the obligations that 
the owner has to the other members of the political community.  The use of 
property must recognize the social character of subjects, as well as their 
interdependence.  The stability, prosperity, and justice of the political 
community depend on all members of the polity, certainly all owners.  
Similarly, in this type of property system it is clear that autonomy is not 
exercised in the abstract.
 
153  It is exercised within particular contexts that 
determine the options available to the subjects, as well as their value.154
These contexts are also directly related to the existence or absence of the 
material conditions necessary for the exercise of autonomy.  The owners, 
with the productive use of their property, and the state, with its intervention, 
should help all citizens to access the basic material conditions that they 
need to truly exercise their autonomy.  Thus, although the separation 
between public and private spheres is at the core of this third property 
system, its boundaries become more porous.  Property and the market 
continue to be situated in the private sphere.  However, the state has an 
obligation to intervene in these matters to ensure the material equality of its 
citizens.  The Constitution is no longer a political program dependent on the 
will of legislators for its development and potential application.  The 
Constitution is the norm of norms in the legal system, a norm that has 
immediate and direct application and that requires that individuals comply 
with the social function of their property. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The three legal systems that define and regulate property in the recent 
history of Colombia are structured around three liberal values:  autonomy, 
equality, and solidarity.  However, each of these systems interprets and 
balances these values differently.  The first is a classical liberal system that 
is structured around the autonomy and formal equality of owners.  The 
second—a system with autonomy and formal equality on the one hand, and 
solidarity and substantive equality on the other—is in tension.  The third is 
a system that gives priority to the principles of solidarity and substantive 
equality over autonomy and formal equality.  These systems of property are 
intertwined with the political struggles for the definition and control of the 
 
 151. See Gómez & López, supra note 150, at 6. 
 152. See id. at 3–4. 
 153. CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 31–41 (1991). 
 154. Id. 
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Colombian state.  The political programs of the Regeneration and 
Revolución en Marcha, as well as the process to recreate the polity that was 
attempted with the 1991 Constitution, determined the characteristics of the 
right to property in each of the moments analyzed in this Article. 
Finally, the political and academic understanding of each of these 
systems of property is strongly influenced by five conceptual oppositions:  
individualism–solidarity; limited intervention–general intervention; 
private–public; Constitution as political program–Constitution as norm; and 
property as a right–property as social function.  The components of each of 
these oppositions intertwine with its ideological peers to constitute the 
conflicting fields that have determined the way in which Colombians think 
about property. 
